Unfair Competition—Preemption by Federal Patent Law.—Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.; Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc by Siano, Vincent A
Boston College Law Review
Volume 6 | Issue 1 Article 17
10-1-1964
Unfair Competition—Preemption by Federal
Patent Law.—Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.;
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc
Vincent A. Siano
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Casenotes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Vincent A. Siano, Unfair Competition—Preemption by Federal Patent Law.—Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co.; Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc, 6 B.C.L. Rev. 138 (1964),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol6/iss1/17
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
remain quite scarce. However, it seems probable that most states, if not
all, will adopt statutes similar to the federal tax lien statute, thus giving
each state's tax lien priority over the federal lien when the state makes its
assessment first. This might eventually lead to congressional declaration of a
superiority of the federal lien.
ROBERT M. STEINBACH
Unfair Competition—Preemption by Federal Patent Law.—Sears, Roe-
buck FS Co. v. Stiff el Co.;' Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.2—
The Supreme Court recently decided two cases which will affect the area
within which the states may employ their laws of unfair competition. In the
first, Sears, Roebuck & Co. marketed a pole lamp substantially identical to
a patented lamp3 which Stiffel Co. had previously placed on the market.
Stiffel immediately began an action in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of North Carolina, which was transferred to the Northern
District of Illinois,4 charging Sears in the first count with patent infringe-
ment, and in the second, with unfair competition in that the sale of the Sears
lamp resulted in consumer confusion. The district court, invalidating the
patent for want of invention, 3 decided for Sears on the first count; but observ-
ing that the Sears lamp could cause consumer confusion and had, in fact, al-
ready caused such confusion, found for Stiffel on the second count. The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari. HELD: The law of unfair competition may not be used
to prohibit the copying of an article which is unprotected by federal Taw and
which is in the public domain.
In the second case, Day-Brice Lighting, Inc. sold a patented6 lighting
fixture which had a distinctive cross-ribbed light reflector. Subsequently,
Compco Corporation's predecessor 7 placed a very similar fixture on the
market. Day-Brite then began an action for patent infringement, also charg-
ing that Compco had copied the distinctive reflector, which the public had
come to associate with Day-Brite as the manufacturer, so as to confuse and
deceive purchasers, and thus constitute unfair competition. The district court
held Day-Brite's patent invalid, but found Compco guilty of unfair compe-
tition despite the absence of fraudulent practices on the ground that the
fixture identified Day-Brite as its source and the presence of a similar fixture
on the market was likely to cause, and had in fact caused, public confusion.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
1
 376 U.S. 225, rehearing denied, 376 U.S. 973 (1964).
2 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
3
 The pole lamp was protected by design and mechanical patents.
4
 The district courts have original jurisdiction in any civil action based upon unfair
competition if joined with a substantial and related claim under federal copyright,
patent or trademark laws. 62 Stat. 931 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1948).
5
 See 66 Stat. 797 (1952), 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1958).
Day-Brite's fixture was protected by a design patent.
7 Compco Corporation had acquired the Mitchell Lighting Co. prior to the filing of
the complaint in the district court.
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HELD: A state may not prevent the copying of a federally unprotected
article which is in the public domain even though a particular feature of that
article has come to identify its source, i.e., has acquired a secondary meaning.
Prior to these decisions there had grown up a substantial body of law
aimed at the elimination of public deception stemming from the piratical
practices of those seeking a share of a particular market. 9 Under this law of .
unfair competition as originally formulated, the mere copying of an article
unprotected by patent or copyright would not be actionable, unless the added
ingredient of public deception were present. 9 This deception could result from
the copier's attempt to take advantage of the popularity of the originator's
goods by "palming off" his copy as the product of the originator." It could
also result from the copying of an article which had already acquired a sec-
ondary meaning, i.e., an identification by the public of the article with the
originator and reliance on this identification, at least in part, in their pur-
chase." This secondary-meaning doctrine, however, is limited in its applica-
tion by the distinction drawn between an item's functional and nonfunctional
aspects; since the originator's article will be protected only in those features
which are termed nonfunctional." With a view to the basic common law
policy of the freest competitive markets, the definition of the term functional
has been expanded—and thus protection restricted—to include not only those
features which are utilitarian and essential, but also those which contribute
to the marketability of the article."
This "orthodox" view of the law of unfair competition is not, however,
the only one. There is another view—the doctrine of misappropriation."
This doctrine received its greatest impetus from the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in International News Serv. v. Associated Press.' 5 It has as its ostensible
objective the protection of "property rights," although the precise meaning of
property right is not quite evident." Actually the doctrine is concerned with
the fairness or unfairness of a particular activity. Its objective seems to be
the formulation of a minimum standard of business ethics without regard to
8 Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 Fed. 299 (2d Cir. 1917).
9 Swank, Inc. v. Anson, Inc., 196 F.2d 330 (1st Cir. 1952) ; Chas. D. Briddell v.
Alglohe Trading Corp., 194 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1952) ; Jessar Mfg. Corp. v. Berlin, 380
Pa. 453, 110 A.2d 396 (1955).
10 Sinko v. Snow-Craggs Corp., 105 F.2d 450 (7th Cir. 1939).
Sinko v. Snow-Craggs Corp., supra note 10; Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn &
Bishop Co., supra note 8; French Am. Reeds Mfg. Co. v. Park Plastics Co., 20 N.J.
Super. 325, 90 A.2d 50 (1952). See Restatement, Torts 741 (1938).
52 Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952).
'3 J. C. Penny Co. v. H. D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1941) ;
Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). See
Note, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 544 (1964).
14 See Sell, The Doctrine of Misappropriation in Unfair Competition, 11 Vand. L.
Rev. 483 (1958) ; Callmann, He Who Reaps Where He Has Not Sown: Unjust Enrich-
ment in the Law of Unfair Competition, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 595 (1942).
is 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
le The right protected by the misappropriation doctrine has been characterized as
a relational right, i.e., ". .. the basis of the decision Es] is to be found in the relation
between the parties, rather than in a general property right of the complainant." Callmann,
op. cit. supra note 14, at 597.
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the presence or absence of public deception. The Court in the International
News Service case, in answering the defendant's contention that the news,
once published by the Associated Press, had become public property, stated,
"[T]he fault in the reasoning lies in applying as a test the right of the
complainant as against the public, instead of considering the rights of com-
plainant and defendant, competitors in business, as between themselves.""
The Court went on to state that the defendant had endeavored to sell as
its own, the news which the Associated Press had gathered by the expenditure
of its labor, skill and money, and that defendant ". . . [was] endeavoring
to reap where it [had] not sown.""
The Supreme Court, by its decisions in the Sears and Compco cases,
has sounded the death knell for the states' application of the doctrine of
secondary meaning, or any other prohibitory doctrine, to prevent copying
in the area of article simulation on the ground of federal preemption in the
field. The gist of the decisions is that the states, although they may require
such precautionary measures as labeling to eliminate or minimize public
confusion or deception, and may impose liability upon those who inten-
tionally deceive the public by "palming off" their copies as the original,
may not prohibit the copying of those articles and features of articles which
are in the public domain," and which are not federally protected. The Court
expresses the opinion that to allow the states to do so would be to allow
the states to defeat the federal objective of rewarding invention by the
granting of a limited monopoly in the hope of fostering further inventive
talent.2° The Court's pronouncement amounts to a statement that a state's
prohibition, on any doctrinal basis, against copying a nonfederally pro-
tected or protectable article which has found favor among the public, prevents
the entry of a potential competitor into a particular segment of the economy
and thus extends state protection where federal law says none should exist.
In view of the fact that the Sears and Compco decisions specifically
do not foreclose the states from imposing liability for "palming off," and
in view of the present legal definition of functional, i.e., all features which
contribute to the marketability of an article, 2' and in view of the fact that
the property interest protectable by the doctrine of misappropriation is
something other than the "right" to use an item in the public domain for
one's own commercial advantage, the Sears and Compco decisions are not
as far reaching as would appear at first glance.
First, since the states still retain the power to impose liability for
"palming off," it would be unrealistic to believe that they could not effec-
tively prevent copying if it were to be done for the purpose of "palming off."
17
 International News Serv. v. Associated Press, supra note 15, at 239.
18
 Id. at 239.	 -
19
 There are numerous expressions in both opinions to the effect that the states
may not put out of the public's reach what federal law has put within it.
20
 The Court states: "To allow a State by use of its laws of unfair competition
to prevent the copying of an article which represents too slight an advance to be
patented would be to permit the State to block off from the public something which
federal law has said belongs to the public." Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel, supra note 1,
at 231-32.
21 See cases cited supra note 13.
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Therefore, this practice could not result in any economic advantage for the
copier. Secondly, very little ornamentation which goes into a consumer
product does not contribute to the marketability of that product, and it is
precisely this type of ornamentation which the law of unfair competition
regards as nonfunctional and will protect against copying. Thus the area
of nonfunctional characteristics which the states could have protected against
copying, and from which the Sears and Compco decisions have now banished
state power, was quite small and relatively unimportant. Thirdly, the limita-
tion upon the power of the states is only operative when the article is in the
public domain, i.e., when no one person can acquire an exclusive right to use,
sell, or otherwise control a particular item. Since the right to use the item
in the form in which it publicly exists belongs equally to al1, 22 under most
circumstances no one person could acquire a protectable "property interest"
under the doctrine of misappropriation, and thus the doctrine affords little
protection in this particular area. Perhaps the doctrine has its greatest
application in the area of artistic and literary performances, 23
 where it seeks
to prevent, not the copying of the idea behind the performance, but rather
the unauthorized appropriation of the performance itself. Thus the "property
interest" of the performer in his performance is recognized and protected 24
in much the same way as unpublished artistic and literary creations are
protected by the doctrine of common law copyright 2 6
 It is unlikely that the
Sears and Cornpco decisions meant to preclude the states from affording pro-
tection in this area. To do so would open the door to a host of piratical prac-
tices in the recording, movie and other performance industries. In fact, it has
already been held that the Sears and Compco decisions do not affect this type
of protection.2°
In conclusion, very little change can be expected in a state's application
of its law of unfair competition as a result of the Sears and Compco decisions.
22 The situation here is the same as exists upon the expiration of a federal patent
or copyright. At that time, the article, as it was protected by the patent or copyright,
passes into the public domain. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938);
G. Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1962).
23
 Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956); Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327
Pa. 433, 194 AtI. 631 (1937). It should be noted that federal copyright protection is
unavailable for phonograph records or other sound recordings. 37 C.F.R. 202.8(b)
(Supp. 1959).
24
 See cases cited supra note 23.
25
 The common-law gives to a man a protectable "property right" in the un-
published products of his creative mind. This right is essentially a prepublication right.
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). The right is divested by the placing of the
creation in the public domain by publication without reservation and without obtaining
a statutory copyright. Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262 (D.C.
Cir. 1960). See Note, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 699 (1960). It has already been held that
the Sears and Compco decisions did not affect common-law copyright. Edgar H. Wood
Associates, Inc. v. Skene, 1964 Mass. Adv. Shs. 647, 197 N.E.2d 886 (1964); Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Documentaries Unlimited, Inc., — Misc. —, 248
N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
26 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Greatest Records, Inc., 32 U.S.L. Week 2686 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. June 22, 1964); Flamingo Telefilm Sales, Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 32 U.S.L.
Week 2579 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 1, 1964).
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The states still retain the ability to protect the public from "palming off"
through the imposition of liability for so doing. Undoubtedly, the two de-
cisions will have their greatest impact upon those states which apply the
functional-nonfunctional distinction in protecting consumer products; but
even here the area eliminated from the scope of state power has limited
significance. Finally, the effect of the Sears and Compco directive upon those
states which apply the doctrine of misappropriation should be negligible,
because the area to which that directive refers is that of the public domain.
Since there is no unfairness in the copying of an item in the public domain,
there can be no "property interest" to be protected by the doctrine of mis-
appropriation.
VINCENT A. SIANO
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